This paper estimates the e!ect of corporate governance provisions on shareholders' value and long-term outcomes. We exploit the outcomes of S&P1500 shareholder votes in annual meetings using a regression discontinuity design to identify their causal e!ect on performance.
Introduction
The agency problem -the conict created by the misalignment of incentives between owners and managers -is at the heart of how economists think about the rm (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) ; and the corporate governance structure of the rm should be designed to minimize the costs created by that conict. Yet, a critical element of corporate governance in modern corporations are provisions that protect managers from the external discipline of takeovers (such as poison pills, staggered boards or golden parachutes), and statutes that insulate them from the monitoring and control of shareholders (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Bebchuck, Cohen and Ferrell, 2004) . It may be optimal to protect managers in this way if excessive shareholder oversight is disruptive or encourages them to focus on short-term gains at the expense of long-term performance (Comment and Schwert, 1995; Stein, 1988) . Some have argued, however, that boards of directors are not su"ciently independent from management and that shareholder activism may have limited ability to bring about e!ective control. As a result, current corporate governance arrangements may not result from an optimal decision by shareholders, but rather reect imperfections in the political process inside the rm and the excessive power of constituencies with other goals Mullainathan, 2001 and Perez-Gonzalez, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007) .
Establishing empirically how increasing shareholder rights a!ects shareholder value and performance is essential for our understanding of the political economy of rms and has clear implications that are relevant to the current debate on shareholder oversight and regulatory reform of corporate governance. Prior research has shown that legislative changes that a!ect external governance measures, such as state-level anti-takeover legislation, increase managerial slack and reduce performance (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Garvey and Hanka, 1999; Giroud and Mueller, forthcoming) .
Internal governance arrangements, the ones developed by the rm itself, have been the subject of much research but the evidence provided in these papers is mixed, and most importantly is based on correlations, rather than causal estimates.
1 This paper provides a causal estimate of the e!ect of changes in the rm's internal corporate governance structure on shareholder value and managers' behavior.
In practice, it is generally di"cult to nd a setting where the governance structure of a rm changes exogenously such that we can estimate a causal e!ect. We argue that a regression dis-continuity design on the outcomes of shareholder proposals in annual meetings provide us with this ideal quasi-experimental setting (Cellini, Ferreira and Rothstein, 2010) . It also allows us to overcome two important limitations of any analysis based on a regression of stock market returns on the presence of governance provisions. First, the choice of governance structure and the type of provisions adopted by rms is arguably endogenous and correlated with other rm characteristics, such that comparing the returns of rms with di!erent governance structures is likely to capture the e!ect of those unobserved characteristics, rather than the e!ect of governance. Second, if investors know about the superior performance of better-governed rms, their knowledge should be incorporated into prices, and we should not observe any systematic di!erences in abnormal returns (as emphasized by Core, et al., 2006) . To overcome these limitations we need a setting in which governance rules are exogenously or "randomly" adopted and, at the same time, one in which their adoption is not foreseen by the market and incorporated into returns.
In their annual meetings, shareholders propose and vote on a large number of governancerelated provisions. 2 Our approach is to compare the stock market reaction to shareholder-sponsored governance proposals that pass by a small margin, to those that fail by a small margin. We show that, even though these proposals are not binding, passing a proposal by a small margin increases discretely its probability of implementation. For these close call proposals, passing is akin to an independent random event (it is "locally" exogenous) and therefore uncorrelated with rm characteristics. We show that indeed, for votes around the majority threshold passing is uncorrelated with observed rm characteristics, such that by focusing on these proposals we can estimate a causal e!ect. 3 In addition, it is precisely for these close call proposals that the vote contains substantial information -switching from an unpredictable outcome to either pass or failthat is not already fully incorporated in prices. We present an analytical framework that shows how stock prices should react for each observed vote outcome, such that we can recover the value of passing a provision from the outcome of votes around the majority threshold. We also discuss how the observed reaction varies with the probability of implementing a proposal and other information that may be contained in the vote outcome. This is, in a nutshell, the regression discontinuity design that provides us with causal estimates of the e!ect of shareholder-sponsored proposals.
Our dataset includes all shareholder-sponsored governance proposals voted on in U.S. rms in the S&P 1500 (plus another 500 widely held rms) between 1997 and 2007. 4 Given the structure of our data, we adopt the empirical dynamic regression discontinuity model proposed by Cellini, Ferreira and Rothstein (2010) , and allow for the result of the vote in any given annual meeting to a!ect future outcomes and the votes in future meetings. We also adapt this methodology to deal with multiple votes in one meeting.
The results show, on the day of the vote, a shareholder governance proposal that passes yields an abnormal return of 1.3% relative to one that fails; there are no signicant additional returns on subsequent days. This price reaction is more pronounced for the set of anti-takeover provisions included in the G-Index developed by Gompers et al. (2003) , suggesting that these are important for governance (since Jensen, 1986 , it has been argued that takeover threats are an important form of managerial discipline). 5 We also nd that other proposals, such as those increasing board independence, have a positive, but weaker, e!ect on returns. Finally, we nd that the e!ect is stronger among rms with concentrated ownership, for those with a large number of anti-takeover provisions in place, and for those with high R&D expenditures.
Since the outcome of these votes is not binding, the price reaction is likely to under-estimate the full value of implementing these proposals. In addition, passing a proposal may a!ect the probability that other provisions are proposed and passed in the future. We need to take into account this information to estimate the value of implementing a proposal. We estimate that passing a proposal around the discontinuity leads to a discrete 31% increase in the probability of implementation (we measure implementation as the change in the number of anti-takeover provisions the rm has in place), and to an increase in the probability of proposing and passing proposals in future meetings. Using these probabilities, we calculate that adopting a governance proposal increases shareholder value by 2.8%. This is a non-negligible e!ect, and it implies that one standard deviation improvement in governance -as measured by the G-Index-would lead to a 7% increase in shareholder value.
The estimated stock price reaction may reect the expectation of changes in performance from governance improvements, and the implied reduction in agency costs but it may also reect a pure takeover premium (if a takeover is more likely under the new governance arrangement). To explore the relevance of these two possible explanations, we examine the real e!ects beyond the stock price reaction on the day of the vote. The regression discontinuity design allows us to study the e!ect of the new governance arrangements on variables such as acquisitions and capital expenditures, which have been used as proxies for empire building and potentially ine"cient behavior (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003) . We nd that acquisitions and capital expenditures fall as a result of passing corporate governance proposals. We also nd evidence that rm value -as reected by Tobin's Q, book-to-market value of the rm-increases in the years following the vote. We interpret these results as evidence that rms are operated di!erently as a result of their improved corporate governance structure, reecting changes in managers' behavior. Finally, the e!ect that identify is, by denition, only for rms that have observations around the discontinuity, and this determines how much one can extrapolate the results of our analysis to other rms. We show that rms that have observations fall around the threshold are not very di!erent from other rms that are targets, and that actually 35% of the G-Index proposals fall within 10 percentage points of the majority threshold, which suggests that our results can be directly generalizable to a sizeable set of rms, though not to all.
The next section describes the data and presents an analytical framework of how the information on the stock price reaction to the outcome of governance votes that fall around the majority threshold allows us to recover the e!ect of governance proposals. Section III presents the empirical model used to identify this e!ect. Section IV provides evidence on the regression discontinuity in shareholder votes as a quasi-experiment. Section V presents the results, and Section VI concludes.
2 Shareholder votes and abnormal returns
Data description
To estimate the value of governance proposals, we use data collected by Riskmetrics on shareholders'
proposals from 1997 until 2007. 6 Our sample includes all shareholder proposals that are classied as governance-related by Riskmetrics and are included in the proxy statement for all S&P 1,500
companies plus an additional 500 rms that are widely held (Appendix A shows the full list of proposals and how frequently each of them appears in the data). We have a sample of 3,984
shareholders' governance proposals. Riskmetrics provides data on the company name, the date of the annual meeting, the percentage of votes in favor of the proposal, the description of the type of 6 Rule 14a-8 permits shareholders to submit proposals requesting that certain corporate matters be put to a vote at the company's next annual meeting. To be eligible to submit a proposal, a shareholder must be a benecial owner of at least 1% or $2,000 in market value of securities entitled to vote, have owned these securities for at least one year; and continue to own them through the date of the meeting.
proposal, and the proponent. 7 Most shareholder proposals are presented as a recommendation to the board of directors, that is, the outcome of the vote is non-binding. Ertimur, Ferri and Stubben (forthcoming) show that 31.1% of the shareholder proposals that pass are implemented while only 3.2% of those that are not approved are implemented.
Riskmetrics classies the proposals into 72 distinct types. For descriptive purposes we group these governance proposals into six broader categories widely used in the literature: anti-takeover proposals (G-Index), compensation, voting, auditors, board structure and other (see Appendix A).
Panel A of Table 1 displays the frequency of governance proposals, the percent approved and the average support over time. From 2003 onwards there is a signicant increase in the number of proposals, over 400 cases per year, and around 30% of those are approved. Panel B also shows that G-index proposals obtained the highest levels of shareholder support, 51% on average, while compensation proposals garnered 23%, board structure 22% and voting proposals only 14%. This di!erence is most dramatic when we look into the approval rate. G-Index proposals are approved in 53% of the cases -supporting the view that shareholders believe these proposals are relevant for the rm. Compensation proposals were approved only in 4.2% of the cases, board structure in 8.8%
and voting proposals in 3.3%. For practical purposes, the di!erence in approval rates means that we have very few observations on compensation, board structure or voting around the discontinuity, so we will have to pool all those proposals and analyze them together. Appendix A shows the number of proposals of each type that fall around the discontinuity. Throughout the paper, we analyze the two sets of proposals (G-index vs. Other) both pooled and separately.
For the 948 rms that constitute our nal sample, we obtained additional information from a number of di!erent sources: security prices from CRSP; nancial information from Compustat; data on acquisitions from the SDC database; institutional ownership characteristics from Thomson Financial. 8 Table 2 displays the characteristics of the rms in our sample. 7 We checked that all the proposals go in the direction of increasing shareholder rights and control, or improving alignment. We also used a second dataset provided by Riskmetrics with information on whether majority is computed out of votes cast or outstanding, and on the majority threshold. Of the 3,984 proposals, three had a 66.7% threshold, three had a 70% threshold and four had an 80% threshold. We also used this dataset to check that the vote was correctly recorded. In the cases where we found discrepancies between the two datasets we looked at the company statements.
8 Most of these datasets are recorded at the end of the scal year. To determine what is the rst observation after a vote, we require that the end of the scal year is at least six months after the meeting where the vote is recorded. If it is less than six months, then we use the following year available as the rst year after the meeting.
Identifying shareholder returns from votes on governance proposals
In this section, we present an analytical framework that shows how to recover the value of a governance provision by focusing on close votes in shareholder-sponsored governance proposals. Figure 1 provides an illustration. Denote ! as the vote share in favor of passing a proposal, and " (!) as the value to the rm of a particular vote outcome. For simplicity, we assume throughout this illustration that the outcome of the vote is always binding, that the majority threshold for a vote to be approved is ! > 50% and that the value of the proposal to the rm is xed (i.e. independent of !) such that " (!) = " if ! > 50% and zero otherwise. Figure 1 represents " (!) and shows the change in the underlying value of the rm after the vote. The objective of the empirical analysis is to estimate " , the value of implementing a governance proposal, which is not directly observable.
As the day of the vote approaches, investors use all the available information to form an expectation of the probability that the proposal succeeds, and this expectation is incorporated in stock prices.
Therefore, the price reaction -the abnormal return-that we observe when the outcome of the vote is known is the di!erence between the actual value of the proposal to the rm " (!) (which is either " or 0 depending on whether it passes or not) and its expected value before the vote (the average price that the market had formed for a given observed vote outcome), #(" |!).
is represented by a dashed line in Figure 1 . The intuition behind #(" |!) is that for votes that have a vote share ! close to zero, the market had already assigned a low probability that they pass, and therefore #(" |!) is close to zero. Similarly, for votes around 100% the market assigned a high probability of passing and #(" |!) is close to " . In contrast, around the threshold, the market had assigned a roughly 50% probability that the vote passes and #(" |!) is close to
is a continuous function of !, but " (!) is discontinuous at the majority threshold, the abnormal return that one observes when the outcome of the vote is known is also discontinuous at the majority threshold. In fact, the di!erence in abnormal returns at the majority threshold -% in Figure 1 -between a vote that barely fails and one that barely passes is exactly the value of the proposal. Under the set of assumptions outlined earlier:
Therefore, one can recover the value of the proposal from the di!erence in abnormal returns of close-call votes, or, in other words, at the discontinuity.
The earlier example made a number of assumptions that may not necessarily hold in reality.
In practice, shareholder proposals are typically not binding. A proposal may pass but not be 9 See supplemental Appendix for details on how to derive !(" |#) analytically$ implemented such that " (!) will be below the e!ective value of the proposal to the right of the threshold, and the market reaction to proposals that pass by a close margin would be less positive than if the vote were binding. Similarly, if management feels that a proposal that does not pass by a few votes should still be implemented, " (!) will be slightly positive to the left of the threshold and the market reaction will be less negative. Furthermore " (!) may incorporate the probability that the current vote triggers another proposal in the future that, in turn, may or may not pass.
As a result, #(" |!) and abnormal returns are not necessarily symmetric around the threshold, as in our simple example in Figure 1 . Still, provided #(" |!) is continuous around the threshold, then % can be used to measure the value of the proposal to the rm. In this case, the value estimated at the discontinuity, %, is not equal to " , as in the previous example. In order to recover the value of " from our estimate %, we need to consider that, around the discontinuity, the market is updating both the probability of implementation and the chances of proposing and passing future proposals.
Note that, our identication strategy does not require that proposals are binding. As shown by Angrist and Pischke (2009) , the identication strategy is still valid as long as there is a discrete jump in the probability of implementation at the majority threshold (this is the "fuzzy" regression discontinuity setting).
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We can dene & ! as the di!erence in the probability of implementation of a proposal that passes by a short margin relative to one that fails by a short margin. Similarly, we can dene & " #+$ as the endogenous change in the probability of passing and subsequently implementing another proposal ' periods from now (as a result of the current proposal passing at the discontinuity). Assuming a discount rate of ( $ ) the market reaction at the threshold % can therefore be written as the sum of two elements: the value associated with the current proposal being implemented, (& ! " % ), plus the present discounted value of future proposals being passed and implemented as a result of the current proposal passing (
#+$ from the data, the value of the proposal can be recovered as:
One important question that arises when trying to infer the value of a proposal from the abnormal returns at the discontinuity is whether we should expect any e!ect at all of votes that barely pass or fail. Shareholder votes should reect a value maximizing decision. If all shareholders were trying to maximize shareholder value, and in the absence of transaction costs, then they should all vote in the same way, in favor or against a proposal. If shareholders are identical but have di!erent information on the value of a proposal, then some votes would fall around the discontinuity and those would correspond to proposals whose value to the rm is neutral or uncertain. However, when the objective of some shareholders is not to maximize shareholder's value (say, in the presence of other private benets), then the outcome of the vote will depend on the distribution of their preferences. In this sense, it is well-documented that di!erent types of shareholders vote di!erently because they are heterogeneous in their objectives, and may have other stakes in the rm. For example, it has been
shown that banks and insurance companies tend to side with management by voting against the proposals, while mutual funds, unions, advisors and pension funds tend to support the proposals (Brickley, Lease and Smith,1988; Agrawal, 2008) . The fact that we nd positive abnormal returns at the discontinuity suggests that there are decisions that maximize shareholder value but are hard to implement given the ownership patterns of rms. Figure 2 shows the impact of passing a proposal on shareholder abnormal returns on the day of the meeting. The daily abnormal returns were calculated from CRSP using the three Fama-French factors and the momentum factor from Carhart (1997) . 11 It is the empirical counterpart of Figure   1 , although note that the fact that, in practice, vote outcomes are not binding and may trigger future proposals, can make the e!ects non symmetric around zero. The graph plots the average daily abnormal return for the the day of the meeting (* = 0)) when the information of the vote is revealed. The X-axis reects the margin of victory (the vote share minus the threshold for that vote). On the day of the vote, proposals that passed by a small margin had positive abnormal returns, and comparing these to those that failed by a small margin gives us the e!ect of passing a proposal on abnormal returns. Notice that proposals that pass by more than a 5% margin display zero abnormal returns, which is consistent with the fact that the market can forecast with some accuracy the probability of passing a proposal, and this is incorporated in prices.
Abnormal returns as a function of the vote share
11 These three factors are standard in the literature and adjust for di!erent sources of risk that should a!ect daily returns, including the market factor (excess market return), a size factor, and a factor that accounts for the security being a value or growth stock (using book to market). The estimation period starts two months prior to the event date; the length of the estimation period is 200 trading days, and we impose at least 15 days with returns to make it into the sample.
This section describes how we can estimate the causal e!ect of shareholder governance proposals on shareholder returns and other outcomes using a Regression Discontinuity (RD) setting.
Regression discontinuity in shareholder votes
Suppose that shareholders of rm + vote on a shareholder proposal at time *) the meeting date, and that this proposal gets a total vote share (percentage of votes in favor) ! %# $ If ! %# is larger than the majority threshold ! ! , then this proposal passes and we code the indicator for pass as
We are interested in the e!ect that passing a certain proposal has on an outcome variable -%# $ Then, we can write:
where the coe"cient / we are interested in is the e!ect of passing a proposal in a shareholder meeting on the outcome variable -%# -say abnormal returns, or the probability of future proposals passing-and 0 %# represents all other determinants of the outcome (#(0 %# ) = 0). The problem with estimating a regression such as (2) directly is that the passing of a proposal is a highly endogenous outcome, and , %# is unlikely to be independent of the error term [#(, %# ) 0 %# ) 6 = 0] such that the estimate of b / will be biased.
To get a consistent estimate, ideally we would want "passing" a proposal to be a randomly assigned variable. The regression discontinuity framework that exploits the vote shares helps us approximate this ideal setup because in an arbitrarily small interval around the discontinuity (the threshold ! ! ), whether the proposal passed or failed, is random (e.g., whether a proposal passes by 50.1% or fails by 49.9% is random). Lee (2008) formally shows that, as long as there is a random component to the vote, the assignment into "treatment" (pass and , %# = 1) and "control" groups (fails and , %# = 0) is random around the threshold. 12 This implies that our estimate of b / using the regression discontinuity design is immune to bias from omitted variables -such as rm announcements-even if they are correlated with the vote as long as their e!ect is continuous around the threshold. Therefore, by comparing the outcome -%# of votes that barely passed to votes that barely failed, we get a consistent estimate of the value of a new governance rule.
In order to use all our data and improve e"ciency, we follow the standard approach (see Lee and Lemieux, forthcoming) and assume that we can approximate the underlying relationship between -%# and ! % ) with a polynomial in the vote share. This polynomial exibly captures the underlying relationship between the vote share and the outcome variable, such that any discontinuous jump at the threshold is captured by /$ Allowing for a di!erent polynomial for observations on the right-hand side of the threshold 1 & (! %# ) 2 & ) and on the left-hand side of the threshold 1 ' (! %# ) 2 ' ) gives:
This estimate, b /, is precisely the estimate of % from section 2.2 ( Figure 1 ). Therefore when -%# are abnormal returns, the regression discontinuity model yields a consistent estimate of %.
Panel data, multiple votes and multiple shareholder meetings
Two issues emerge when trying to implement the standard RD model of equation (3) to analyze the e!ect of governance rules in our data. The rst is that there is a dynamic component to our data that implies that elections at time * will have an impact on outcomes at times * + 1, * + 2, etc.
The second is that for each rm and meeting date, shareholders may have to vote on more than one governance issue (the average number of shareholder governance proposals voted on in a meeting in our sample is 1.64), so we need to nd a way to aggregate all votes by rm and meeting date.
Dynamics in the impact of the votes
We follow the empirical model in Cellini, et al (2010) , to characterize the dynamic version of the RD for a rm + that has a vote at time *, and dene the outcome 3 periods later -%(#+) as:
estimates the causal e!ect of passing a vote at time * on outcomes at *+3$ Estimating equation (4) separately for each period * + 3 , as noted by Cellini et al. (2010) , is ine"cient because there is an important component that is xed within rms over time but varies across rms. We follow their strategy and pool data for multiple 3 (including 3 4 0), and include controls to absorb rm-level heterogeneity. For each election in our data (+) *), we use observations for rm + in periods * ! 2 to * + 5 (5 is up to seven days after the election for abnormal returns and four years after the election for other outcomes). We then estimate:
This follows equation (7) in Cellini et al. (2010) (see, also, more details for the sample construction in that paper). 13 6 ) ) 7 * and 8 %# are xed e!ects for time periods relative to the meeting date, calendar years and focal elections, respectively. / ) ) 2 & ) and 2 ' ) are allowed to vary for 3 > 0) and constrained to zero for 3 4 0) and standard errors are clustered by rm +. Here, / ) is the e!ect of passing a proposal at time *, on outcomes 3 periods later, and we obtain separate estimates for the contemporaneous e!ect (3 = 0)) one period later (3 = 1), etc. Notice that this dynamic model allows us to introduce focal meeting xed e!ects 8 %# ) and those will absorb any characteristic of the meeting that a!ects outcomes in periods * + 3 (e.g., characteristics of the rm that are constant during the event window).
Aggregating votes
Next, we need to nd a way to aggregate all votes for a given rm and meeting date. To illustrate how we do this, we rst ignore dynamics and use the simple (non-dynamic) equation (3). Imagine that the rm could vote on two issues, A and B, on any given date. Then, we would extend equation (3) to allow for two di!erent kinds of votes to a!ect -%# :
and / , (/ -) would be the e!ect of proposals of type A (B) on the outcome of interest. The problem is that there are not just two types of governance proposals but 72 (see Appendix A). Given that we identify e!ects only around the discontinuity, the number of observations limits how much we can separate out the e!ects. However, under the assumption that for all : and ; :
we can rewrite equation (3) as:
And / is the average causal e!ect of a proposal. In order to allow for more exibility than this arguably restrictive but practical assumption allows, we will allow / to vary by two relevant groups of proposals (anti-takeover provisions vs./ other proposals). We will also let the e!ect of /) to be non-linear in the number of proposals passed. Unfortunately, the number of observations that are around the discontinuity limits how exible we can be in allowing for more disaggregated groups.
When we restrict our analysis to meetings where only one governance proposal is voted on (and therefore we do not need to aggregate across proposals), we obtain results similar to those using multiple votes in a day, such that equation (6) appears to be a good way to summarize the data.
When we put together equations (5) and (6), which recognize the dynamic structure of the data and the need to aggregate over < proposals, we obtain our estimating equation:
Throughout the paper we use a polynomial of order four on either side of the threshold (Supplemental Appendix Table A shows that our results are robust to the use of higher order polynomials).
Election votes as a quasi-experiment:vote distribution and pre-existing di!erences
The basic assumption of the regression discontinuity design is that around the threshold, passing a proposal is as good as random assignment. Here, we provide evidence for the validity of this assumption. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the vote share (the percentage of votes in favor) for all votes in our sample. If there were sharp changes in that distribution around the threshold, this would indicate that the probability of falling on either side of the threshold is discontinuous and that the main identication assumption is likely not to hold (McCrary, 2008) . Figures 4 and 5 show the distribution of votes separately for proposals to remove anti-takeover provisions (those included in the G-index), and Other proposals to increase shareholder control (including compensation, board-related and auditor-related proposals). In these, we also see that the distribution is smooth around the threshold. 14 Listokin (2008) also reports a smooth distribution of shareholder-sponsored proposals around the majority threshold as evidence of lack of strategic behavior. In contrast, he
shows that management proposals, excluded from our analysis, display a very sharp discontinuity in the density of votes at the majority threshold; essentially, these rarely fail to pass, as management strategically withdraws those proposals that are likely to fail.
Figures 4 and 5 also show that anti-takeover proposals are more likely to fall around the discontinuity. Since our estimates are identied only from observations around the discontinuity, this implies that most of the e!ect we estimate comes from the passage of anti-takeover provisions. It also limits the extent to which we can try to identify the e!ects of di!erent subgroups since we do not have enough observations around the threshold.
A second standard test of the regression discontinuity design consists in evaluating whether prior to the day of the vote, there were systematic di!erences in the characteristics of rms that fall on either side of the threshold. If one found systematic di!erences in characteristics of rms that just pass, relative to those that just fail to pass a proposal, then the main assumption of the design is likely to be violated. The rst column in each panel of Table 3 evaluates whether there is a di!erence in a number of rm characteristics in the period before the meeting, between rms where a proposal passes and those where a proposal fails. The regressions in column 1 do not control for a polynomial in the vote share, such that they estimate the average pre-di!erence in characteristics across all rms. The regressions in column 2 include the polynomials of order four on either side of the threshold, such that they estimate the e!ect at the discontinuity. We see that there is no signicant di!erence in abnormal returns on the day before the meeting (Panel A), or in Tobin's Q, capital expenditures, return on equity or R&D over assets in the year before the meeting (Panel B). There is no di!erence either in the growth rates of those variables on average (column 3), and most importantly for our identication, around the discontinuity (column 4), which indicates the absence of pre-existing di!erences. Panel C examines two acquisitions variables (number and value of acquisitions), and none has signicant di!erences around the threshold.
Next, we examine di!erences in ownership concentration for institutional owners (panel E). As mentioned, the presence of institutional owners is likely to be a determinant of the outcome of the vote and, indeed, in column 1 panel E, we nd that a proposal is more likely to pass in rms with a high reported concentration of institutional owners (measured as the sum of institutional ownership for the top ve shareholders in the last scal quarter before the meeting), or with more institutional owners that report to own at least 5% of shares outstanding. 15 This conrms the fact that one cannot directly compare rms with or without governance provisions in place since these are di!erent kinds of rms. However, once we include the polynomial in the vote share in column 2 15 These two variables are computed using SEC Form 13F quarterly lings, provided by Thomson Financial.
of panel D, we see that there is no signicant di!erence around the threshold, which lends support to our identifying assumption.
Similarly, one expects that rms with di!erent levels of shareholder rights, as measured by the G-index, have di!erent propensities to pass shareholders' governance proposals. Column 1 of Panel E shows that rms with a higher G-index (more anti-takeover provisions in place) are more likely to pass the shareholder proposals. However, rms around the vicinity of the discontinuity do not di!er along this dimension, which further supports the basic identifying assumption of the paper.
Overall, our results show that there is no evidence of selection into either side of the discontinuity based on observable variables.
Results
5.1 Market reaction to exogenous changes in governance. Table 4 shows estimates of the di!erence in abnormal returns between proposals that pass and proposals that do not pass for increasingly small intervals around the election threshold on the day of the vote (standard errors are clustered by rm). Column 1 estimates this on the whole sample and we nd that, as expected, there is no di!erence, on average, between those passing and failing (a highly insignicant estimate of 0.0009) since the market incorporates the expectation in the prices.
The e!ect of governance proposals on abnormal returns
Column 2 restricts the sample to within 10 percentage points of the threshold, and here we begin to see a higher estimate (0.002-i.e., 0.2% daily abnormal return) and a smaller standard error. For votes within 5 percentage points of the threshold, the abnormal return is 0.76% higher for those that passed (and this is signicant at 1%), and as we narrow the window even further to 2 percentage points (column 4) and 1 percentage point (column 5), the abnormal return of passing increases to 1.05% and 1.39%, respectively. These are still signicant even though the number of observations falls as we narrow the window. Panels B and C of Table 4 show the same set of regressions for anti-takeover provisions and all other proposals pooled, respectively. We nd a similar pattern, with most of the e!ect being driven by anti-takeover provisions. This is partly because there are more G-index proposals that fall around the discontinuity, so that we can estimate them more precisely.
It also reects the fact that G-index proposals -in particular the elimination of staggered boards and poison pills-are thought to have a potentially more important impact in insulating managers to pursue their private goals. Within 1 percentage point of the interval, passing an anti-takeover provision yields a 2.2% abnormal return on the day of the vote.
Finally, column 6 makes use of all the data in the sample (as described in section 3.1) and introduces two polynomials of order four in the vote share, one on each side of the threshold (as in equation (3) above). Using this model, we estimate that the e!ect of passing a proposal is 1.3%, which is very close to the unrestricted models of the earlier columns. Figure 6 shows the day-by-day di!erence in abnormal returns between rms where a proposal passes or fails within 5 percentage points on either side of the majority threshold. We observe a clear peak in the di!erence in returns between rms that pass and rms that do not pass a proposal on the day of the vote, * = 0 (this is the same as the coe"cient in column 3 of Table 4 , Panel A).
For other days around the annual meeting, there are no clear spikes or a discernible pattern. This shows that the market incorporates the outcome of the vote on the day of the vote itself -when the outcome is known-and not before. It also seems that there are no further additional returns on the days after the vote. Table 4 is a simple and transparent representation of our data, but it does not take into account that several proposals can be voted on in one day, nor that the e!ect of the vote could potentially persist over more than one day, nor that the returns are likely to be correlated over time, given that they respond to the same events. In order to incorporate these characteristics of the data, we use the full model described in equation (7). The results are shown in Table 5 . Column 1 displays the e!ect of passing a proposal on the meeting date (*), the day after (* + 1) and the cumulative e!ect from * + 2 to * + 7. We nd that most of the e!ect (1.3% abnormal return) is on the day of the vote, when the surprise around the threshold occurs. The following days yield around 0.2% daily abnormal returns, but these are insignicant. Column 2 shows similar results using a di!erent model to compute the daily abnormal returns (a standard one factor market model instead of the three factor Fama-French with momentum that we use in the rest of the analysis).
Overall, we nd that most of the e!ect on prices occurs on the day of the vote. In column 3,
we explore further what happens on that day by allowing for a more exible specication of the e!ect of the number of votes on daily returns (recall that the model in equation (7) sums over the votes of the day to aggregate over all the di!erent outcomes). Here, we allow for di!erent dummy variables for the number of proposals that passed, with a maximum of six proposals passing in a given meeting day. We nd that the e!ect of passing one proposal is 1.3%, similar to our baseline estimate. The e!ect of passing two proposals is 2.2%; three and four proposals yield a total of 4.6% returns; ve proposals passing yield a 7.1% abnormal return that day; and six proposals yield 11.5% abnormal returns. The e!ect is monotonically increasing and approximately linear in the number of proposals. Columns 4 and 5 allow for a di!erent e!ect of the two kinds of proposals:
the set of anti-takeover provisions included in the G-index, and the set of Other proposals. Among these Other (non G-index) proposals, the ones that fall more frequently around the discontinuity are proposals to increase board independence from management and proposals to expense stock options (see Appendix A). We conrm that most of the e!ect is driven by anti-takeover proposals, in particular by proposals to repeal a classied board and to eliminate poison pills (see Appendix A). However, we also nd positive, albeit somewhat smaller and less precisely estimated e!ects of other kinds of proposals, that have received less attention in the literature.
In sum, we nd that there is a signicant 1.3% average price reaction to proposals that pass by a small margin relative to those that fail by a small margin. 16 We argue that the regression discontinuity design allows us to obtain a causal estimate, that is not driven by omitted variables, unobserved rm characteristics or other events. The positive price reaction on the day of the vote may be reecting that the governance improvement will lead to lower agency costs and higher rm value; or it could also reect a takeover premium. In section 5.3 below we study the long-term e!ects of these votes to assess the evidence on these di!erent possible explanations for the positive price reaction.
Heterogeneous e!ects of governance proposals
It is likely that rms with di!erent characteristics may have di!erent quantitative responses to passing a governance proposal. To further investigate this potential heterogeneity in responses, we study the e!ect of governance proposals in di!erent subsets of the data. In particular, we analyze the di!erential response in rms according to the level of concentration of the top 5 institutional owners, the intensity of anti-takeover protection in place at the time of the meeting (G-index), and whether the rms had high R&D expenditures.
We nd that rms with a higher concentration of large institutional owners respond more to passing a provision than rms with more dispersed ownership. In particular, column 1 of Table 6, shows that passing a shareholder proposal in concentrated ownership rms elicits a 2% abnormal return, on the day of the meeting, with a further cumulative 2.3% on the seven days after the meeting (for G-index proposals -column 4-the cumulative return over seven days is 3.6% in concentrated ownership rms). This may reect that these rms are more closely monitored and therefore the proposal is more likely to be implemented, or that the value of these provisions is higher for these rms -and that governance proposals and monitoring are complements in the governance structure. 17 We also nd that rms with many anti-takeover provisions benet more from the removal of takeover barriers. In rms with more than 10 (median) G-index provisions in place at the day of the meeting, passing a G-index shareholder proposal yields a 1.9% abnormal return on the day of the vote, and a further 2.4% in the following seven days (column 5).
The previous analysis shows that, on average, passing a proposal that improves shareholder rights increases shareholder value. However, it is possible that having excessive shareholder rights in place can be detrimental to rms if that leads managers to focus excessively on the short-run at the expense of the long-run (Stein, 1988) . If this were true, rms where long-run investments are important might respond negatively to these governance proposals. We proxy the long-term nature of the rm's investment by their R&D expenditures. Columns 3 and 6 estimate our basic model for rms with above median R&D to assets ratio prior to the meeting. We nd actually that the e!ect for these rms (1.6%) is very similar to the result for the whole sample (1.3%), indicating that there is no di!erent response at least along this dimension of long-run investment needs, and that the change in abnormal returns from changes in the governance structure is also positive for these rms.
Finally, the e!ect that we can identify is, by construction, only for rms that have observations around the discontinuity, and this determines how much one can extrapolate the results of our analysis to other rms. To generalize their application one has to take into account that, within listed rms, those that are larger, less protable and with a higher level of institutional ownership tend to be targeted by shareholder proposals more often (Romano, 2001) . Within the set of rms that are the target of a proposal, we know from section 4 that there are no systematic di!erences between rms on either side of the threshold. We also can see in gure 4 that actually the mass of G-Index proposals fall around the majority threshold. Still, rms with votes around the threshold may be di!erent from other rms in our sample. In order to have a sense of what kinds of rms have observations that fall around the discontinuity, we plot the distribution of institutional ownership and of Tobin's Q in the year before the meeting for (i) rms that have a vote share lower than 45%
(ii) rms that have between 45 and 55% votes in favor-those falling around the discontinuity; and (iii) rms with more than 55% votes in favor. Figures 7 and 8 show that rms with vote shares around the discontinuity fall roughly in between rms in the other two groups (e.g., the distribution 17 For further analysis on the complementarity of governance mechanisms see Cremers and Nair (2005) .
of institutional ownership for proposals in the G-index is between the other two groups, and so is the distribution of Tobin's Q - Figure 7 ). This suggests that the observations that, even though one cannot immediately generalize our results to all rms, for rms that are targeted by these proposals, those that fall around the discontinuity are not "extreme" observations, but, rather, come from rms with average characteristics.
Implementation and the probability of passing future proposals
While we do not have information on whether each proposal in our data was implemented, we know how the value of the G-index changes over time for most rms in our sample. The G-index is the number of anti-takeover provisions in place at a point in time. We can evaluate how it responds to the passing of a provision at the discontinuity. This serves as a proxy for implementation.
Column 1 of Table 7 shows the e!ect of passing a governance proposal on the G-index. The index is available only every two years, so the rst coe"cient is the e!ect on the rst year available after the focal meeting (this can be between one and two years after the meeting, depending on when the vote occurred relative to the G-index years), and the second coe"cient is two years later, etc. We nd that the probability of implementation increases discretely around the discontinuity, such that proposals that pass by a small margin are substantially more likely to be implemented relative to those that fail. Passing a proposal reduces the G-index by 0.313, which we interpret as a 31.3% probability of removing an anti-takeover provision within two years. That number grows in subsequent years, and within four years the probability is 50%. This reects in part that when a proposal is passed but not implemented, shareholders are likely to propose it again.
Passing a governance proposal in a given meeting is also likely to a!ect the probability of submitting and passing other proposals in the future. Ex-ante it is unclear whether it will increase, decrease or have no e!ect on those future probabilities. We assess these dynamic e!ects in our data using equation (8) and, as the dependent variable, the number of proposals that are submitted and passed in each year. The variable is zero if there are no shareholder governance proposals, or if these do not pass. Table 8 shows the results. Column 1 includes the polynomial in the vote share and shows that, around the discontinuity, passing a G-index proposal leads to 0.325 more proposals being passed the following year, 0.119 more two years later, and the positive e!ect declines and becomes insignicant after year four. The e!ect for other proposals is generally insignicant, or negative. The dependent variable in column 2 is the number of G-index proposals passed in each year, and the results indicate that the e!ect in column 1 is mostly driven by G-index proposals.
These results show that there is a substantial dynamic element to these proposals, with passing G-index proposals making it more likely that other proposals are passed in the future.
The value of a governance proposal
In the previous section, we found that passing a provision increased shareholders' returns on the day of the vote by 1.3%. This is our estimate of %, as dened in Section 2.2. However, we know that the abnormal return that we observe is not the full expected increase in value from implementation, but an expectation that accounts for the probability that the proposal will be implemented plus further e!ects of submitting and implementing governance proposals in the future. In order to recover the actual value of a proposal, " , using equation (2) we need to know (i) the probability that the provision is implemented if passed, as well as (ii) the probability that other proposals are passed and implemented in the future.
We obtain estimates for these probabilities in two di!erent ways. The rst is using the results from Table 7 with the G-index as a proxy for implementation. In the previous section we showed that passing a proposal reduces the number of G-index provisions by 0.31. We also found that two years later the probability of implementation is 0.016 higher (0.329-0.313) and two years after that it is 0.174 higher (0.503-0.329) etc. With these probabilities in hand and assuming a discount rate of 5%, we can use equation (1) to recover the value of a provision to the rm. We estimate that to be a 2$8% increase in market value.
As a second way to evaluate the value of a provision, we use di!erent sources for the estimated probabilities that feed into equation (1). Ertimur et al. (forthcoming) nd a 20.7% discrete change in the probability of implementation at the threshold (& ! ) . 18 The probability that a proposal is implemented in the future (& " #+$ ) is equal to the probability that it passes in the future times the probability that it is implemented conditional on passing. The average probability that a proposal that passes is implemented is 31.1% (Ertimur et al, forthcoming) . And the estimated probability of passing a proposal in the future, given that a proposal was passed this year is shown in column 2 of Table 8 . Using these probabilities in equation (2) we estimate that the value of implementing a provision leads to a 2$7% increase in market value.
Therefore, adopting a governance provision increases shareholder value by between 2$7% and 2$8% depending on how we compute the estimate. This translates to an increase in market value for 18 They estimate that the probability of implementation from proposals that obtain 50% to 60% of the vote in favor is 23.9%. The probability that a proposal that failed is implemented is 3.2%. We obtain 20.7% as the di!erence between the two. See Table 1 the average rm in the sample of around US$600 million (average market value is US$22,400 million in 1996 US$) per proposal. This is an economically sizeable e!ect, especially when we take into account that rms often drop several provisions in subsequent meetings. Dropping 2.5 provisions (one standard deviation of the G-index in the sample) translates in a predicted increase in market value of 7%.
Long-run e!ects of governance
In this nal section, we evaluate the e!ect of passing a governance proposal on long-term rm outcomes. The evaluation of these real e!ects is important to establish why the rm's market value increases following the improvement in shareholder rights, and in particular from the removal of anti-takeover provisions. The increase in market value could simply reect that the increased probability of a takeover may lead to a takeover premium. It could also reect an improvement in internal governance and managerial discipline. This would be the case if weak shareholder rights provide substantial protective power to standing managers, (e.g., by insulating them from the takeover market) causing additional agency costs in the form of ine"cient investments, reduced operational e"ciency, and/or private benets.
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All regressions in Table 9 use the empirical model in equation (7), to estimate the e!ect of passing a governance proposal on a number of long-term outcomes, and distinguish between the e!ect of anti-takeover and Other proposals. 20 All regressions in Table 9 include rm-meeting xed e!ects, and cluster standard errors by rm. In addition, our identication comes from the di!erent response of a rm that passes a proposal by a small margin relative to one that fails to pass by a small margin. Therefore, this is a very demanding identication in terms of data requirements, which is bound to yield larger standard errors.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 examine, respectively, whether the number and the value of acquisitions made by a rm signicantly changes in the years following the improvement in shareholder rights. Column 3 evaluates the e!ect on the growth of capital expenditures. Acquisitions may generate value, but they have also been associated with empire-building incentives and excess of 19 Previous studies found that the presence of weak shareholders rights was correlated with higher levels of acquisitions and capital expenditures (as proxies for agency costs), lower valuation (as measured by Tobin's Q and book to market) and mixed results regarding accounting returns (return on equity and return on assets) (e.g. Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuck et al, 2004; Core et al., 2006; Cremers and Nair, 2005) . 20 Financial ratios and other dependent variables used in Table 9 typically have signicant outliers. To avoid the e!ect of inuential observations, for each column of Table 9 we restrict the sample to rm/votes that do not have any observation in the top or bottom 5% of the distribution of the dependent variable. The results are not sensitive to this particular outlier cut-o!, but are sensitive to the inclusion of outliers.
that management entrenchment can lead to overinvestment or increases in corporate slack (Garvey and Hanka, 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Wald and Long, 2007) . Therefore, one way in which improved governance can a!ect performance is through the reduction in unnecessary acquisitions, investments and the growth of capital expenditures. We compute the number and value of rm acquisitions from the SDC database, which records all transactions of at least 5% of market value. The number of acquisitions is dened as the count of acquisitions made from di!erent rms, and the value is computed as the sum of all acquisition prices paid divided by the average market capitalization on the rst and last day of the year. 22 We nd that removing an anti-takeover provision reduces the number of acquisitions made in the years following the vote (column 1). The number falls by 0.03 the year after the vote, 0.17 two years later and 0.18 three years later (only this last coe"cient is signicant though). We nd a similar pattern for the value of these acquisitions (column 2). Column 3 shows that the growth of capital expenditures also seems to decline after a vote to eliminate G-index provisions. For other types of provisions, the e!ect is reversed and capital expenditures actually increase a few years after the vote -this suggests that there may be di!erent channels through which they a!ect performance.
Finally, we examine the long-term performance e!ects of exogenous changes in governance. We use Compustat to construct the rm's Tobin's Q, book-to-market ratio and return on equity as measures of long-term valuation and performance. Column 4 of Table 9 shows that Tobin's Q increases signicantly as a result of passing the governance proposals (both G-index and Other).
Similarly, column 5 shows a signicant reduction in the book-to-market ratio. 23 Again, the e!ect is signicant for both types of proposals. We also nd that return on equity (column 6) increases, but that most of the signicant e!ects are for the non G-index proposals.
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Overall, we nd that, as a result of the removal of anti-takeover provisions, acquisitions and capital expenditures fall, rm valuation increases in the long-run, but little e!ects on earnings. 21 There is evidence on acquisitions often being associated with negative abnormal returns for the bidder on announcement, as well as long-term negative performance (see, for example, Rau and Vermaelen 1998, Loughran and Vijh 1997) . 22 We use the same measures as in Gompers et al. (2003) . 23 Tobin's Q is dened as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is computed as book value of assets (Compustat item: AT) plus the market value of common stock (Compustat item: mkvalt_f) minus the sum of the book value of common stock (Compustat item: CEQ) and balance sheet Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credit (Compustat item: TXDITC). All book values for scal year t are combined with the market value of common equity at the calendar end of year t. Book-to-market ratio is the ratio of book value of common equity (previous scal year) to market value of common equity (end of previous calendar year). Book value of common equity is the sum of book common equity and deferred taxes. 24 Return on Equity (ROE) is dened as net income (NI) divided by the book value of common stock (CEQ) plus balance sheet deferred taxes and Investment tax credit (TXDITC).
While some of these e!ects are imprecisely estimated, taken as a whole, the results above indicate that acquisitions and capital expenditures fall as a result of the removal of anti-takeover provisions, and that rm valuation increases in the long-run. This suggests that the abnormal returns that we identied in earlier sections as a result of governance improvements leads to actual changes in managers' actions. Further, if one is willing to interpret the marginal acquisitions and capital expenditures as value destroying, and a way in which managers extract private benets (e.g., though empire-building), then our evidence suggests that corporate governance provisions increase shareholder value through the disciplining of management and the reduction in agency costs.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present novel evidence on the causal e!ect of corporate governance provisions on the market value and long-term performance of rms. We use a regression discontinuity model on the outcomes of votes on governance proposals in shareholder meetings. Firms that pass a proposal by a close margin are ex-ante similar to those that reject it by a close margin, so that passing a provision is "locally" exogenous. Therefore, this approach provides a causal estimate and overcomes the endogeneity problems that have a!ected the literature thus far. Our empirical strategy allows us to recover an estimate of the e!ect of governance even if the market had already incorporated the probability of passing the shareholder proposal into stock prices. This is because proposals that fall around the majority threshold were ex-ante the most uncertain, such that investors could not perfectly predict whether they would pass or not. It is for these proposals that we are able to observe a price reaction.
We show that, on average, the market reacts to the passage of a governance-related shareholder proposal with positive abnormal returns around 1.3% on the day of the vote. This reects between a 2.7% and a 2.8% increase in market value per implemented proposal. We identify some heterogeneity of this reaction, with the e!ect being more pronounced among rms with concentrated ownership, high pre-existing anti-takeover provisions and high R&D expenditures. Firm behavior also changes with the new governance structure: dropping anti-takeover provisions leads to lower investments and fewer acquisitions. Finally, the long-term performance of the rm, measured as Tobin´s Q or book-to-market ratios, improves after two or three years when anti-takeover provisions are dropped; but we nd modest results with respect to the return on equity.
When analyzed together, our results portray a picture in which good corporate governance for the rms that are targeted by these proposals is rewarded by the market, and generates performance improvements in the long-run. Our results also suggest that the channels behind these improvements include more conservative investment and acquisition policies. Some of these e!ects are common to all shareholder proposals, but they are more pronounced when we concentrate on the ones that lower anti-takeover provisions.
Overall, our results provide evidence that current corporate governance structures do not fully maximize shareholder value, and that the costs of the agency problem for modern corporations are non-negligible. A better understanding of the e!ect of governance provisions, and the magnitude of the agency problem is crucial to guiding the public debate on the adequacy of implementing and regulating corporate governance. It is also important to understand the potential role of shareholder activism to improve the governance of rms and create value. Only causal estimates can be used to infer the impact of changing internal governance structures such as the level of protection from takeover, compensation arrangements or board independence. This paper is an important step towards a better understanding of the consequences of current governance arrangements. [45, 55] , [55, 100] . The graph includes all the proposals in the sample that are not included in the G index.
Institutional Ownership Concentration
Tobin's Q Our sample of 3,984 proposals corresponds to 2,205 firm-year observations. Abnormal Returns are computed from CRSP. G-index is the number of anti-takeover provisions in place at the firm (Source: Riskmetrics). All accounting variables are obtained from Compustat: Total assets (AT), Market Value (mkvalt_f), Capital expenses (CAPX). Tobin's Q is defined as the market value of assets (AT+mkvalt_f-CEQ) divided by the book value of assets (AT), and balance sheet Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credit (TXDITC). Book-to-market is the ratio of book value of common equity (previous fiscal year) to market value of common equity (end of previous calendar year). Ownership by Top 5 Shareholders is the sum of institutional ownership for the top five shareholders in the last fiscal quarter before the meeting, and Institutional Shareholders that own at least 5% is the number of shareholders that own at least 5% of the firm's stock (Source: Thomson 13F Database). Acquisitions Count is the number of acquisitions made in a year, Acquisitions Ratio is computed as the sum of all acquisition prices paid divided by the average market capitalization on the first and last day of the year (Source: SDC). All monetary values are in 1996 US$. Note that the number of observations may change due to missing values in some of the variables.
(1)
A.
-0. Table 3 tests whether passing a vote on the meeting date is systematically related to firm characteristics prior to the meeting. Note that in Panel A t refers to days, while for the rest, t refers to years. Each row corresponds to a different dependent variable and each entry comes from a separate regression. Each entry in the table reports the coefficient on whether a proposal passed. Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) report the estimated effect of passing a vote on outcome variable levels (changes) the year before the annual meeting, t-1 (between t-2 and t-1). Columns 1 and 3 present estimates without controlling for a polynomial in the vote share and, therefore, estimate the average effect of passing relative to not passing. Columns 2 and 4 include the polynomial in the vote share of order 4 on each side of the threshold such that it effectively estimates the effect at the discontinuity. All columns control for year fixed effects and standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the firm level. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively.
Abnormal Return one day before Meeting, Car (-1,-1) Change, from (t-2) to (t-1) Carhart (1997) . Column 1 estimates are based on the whole sample. Column 2 restricts the sample to observations with vote share within ten points of the threshold, column 3 to five points and so forth. Column 6 introduces polynomial in the vote share of order 4, one on each side of the threshold, and uses the full sample. All columns control for year fixed effects; standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively.
Abnormal Returns around the Majority Threshold
A. All Shareholders Proposals B. Anti-Takeover Proposals (In G-index) This table presents the effect of passing a proposal on abnormal returns on the meeting date (t), on the day after (t+1) and the cumulative effect from t+2 to t+7. The dependent variable in columns 1, 3 and 4 is abnormal returns computed using the Fama French and momentum factors (FFM) from Carhart (1997) ; in columns 2 and 5, it is abnormal returns computed using the market model (MM). Column 3 allows for 6 different dummy variables to capture the number of proposals (1 to 6) that passed at the meeting. Columns 4 and 5 allow for a separate effect of anti-takeover proposals (labeled as G-index proposals) and 'Other' governance proposals. The specification in all columns is given by equation 8. All columns control for year fixed effects, firm-meeting fixed effect and distance to the election effects; standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. This table presents the effect of passing a proposal on abnormal returns on the meeting date (t), on the day after (t+1) and the cumulative effect from t+2 to t+7 for different subsamples of firms. The dependent variables in all Columns are abnormal returns computed using the Fama French and momentum factors from Carhart (1997) and the cumulative effect from t+2 to t+7 for different firm subsamples. Columns 1 and 4 include firms with above-median ownership concentration (percentage controlled by the top five institutional owners); Columns 2 and 5 include firms with ten or more anti-takeovers provision (above-median G-index) before the meeting; Columns 3 and 6 include firms with above median R&D/Assets ratio. Columns 4, 5 and 6 allow for a separate effect of anti-takeover proposals (labeled as G-index proposals) and Other governance proposals. The specification in all columns is given by equation 8. All columns control for year fixed effects, firm-meeting fixed effect and distance to the election effects; standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. Column 1 shows the effect of passing a governance proposal on the number of antitakeover provisions in place at the firm (the G-index). The index is provided by Riskmetrics every two years. The first coefficient (Year of vote, t) is the effect of passing a proposal on the G-index for the first year available in Riskmetrics that is at least six months after the meeting; the second coefficient is the effect two years after that, etc. Column 2 allows for 6 different dummy variables to capture the number of proposals (1 to 6) that passed at the meeting. The specification in all columns is given by equation 8. All columns control for year fixed effects, firmmeeting fixed effect and distance to the election effects; standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
C. Shareholder Proposals Excluding Anti-Takeover Proposals

Abnormal Returns and Firm Heterogeneity
Number of Proposals Passed
The dependent variable is the total number of proposals passed in a given year in column 1, the total number of G-index proposals passed in column 2 and the total number of Other proposals passed in column 3. It is equal to zero if a there were no proposals or no proposal was passed. All columns provide separately the effect of G-index and other kinds of proposals on the dependent variable. This is estimated using equation (8), and dropping the observation for t=0 the year of the meeting (where the effect is by definition 1). All columns include a polynomial in the vote share and can be interpreted as the effect of passing a proposal on the number of proposals passed in the future, at the discontinuity. All columns control for year fixed effects, firm-meeting fixed effect and distance to the election effects; standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. This table presents the effect of passing a governance proposal on firm long-term outcomes. The specification in all columns is given by equation 8. All columns allow for a separate effect of anti-takeover proposals (labeled as G-index proposals) and Other governance proposals. The dependent variables are: the number of acquisitions in column 1; the acquisitions ratio--sum of all acquisition prices paid divided by the average market capitalization on the first and last day of the year--in column 2; the growth rate of capital expenditures in column 3; Tobin Q in column 4 (defined as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is computed as the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock minus the book value of common stock and deferred taxes (Kaplan and Zingales (1997) ); book-to-market value of the firm in column 5; returns on equity in 6. See notes to Table 2 for further sources and definitions. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. .03
Effect of Passing a Governance Proposals on Passing Future Proposals
.04
. Carhart (1997) . Columns 1-6 use two polynomials of increasing order in the vote share, v, one on each side of the threshold (right and left). Column 8 displays a unique polynomial of order 8. The specification is equation 8. All columns control for year fixed effects, firm-meeting fixed effect and distance to the election effects; standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively.
Abnormal Returns around the Threshold
